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PANEL I: The Patent Landscape with
Bilski on the Map
Moderator:
Panelists:

Jeanne Fromer
James W. Dabney
Clarisa Long
Brian P. Murphy

MS. SCHAFFER-GOLDMAN:
Hello, we’re going to get started. Thank you all for being here
today.
Welcome to the 2009 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media
and Entertainment Law Journal’s Symposium titled,
“Functionality: At the Crossroads of IP.”
My name is Regina Schaffer-Goldman, and I am the Editor-inChief of the 20th Volume of the Journal, which is more
affectionately known as the IPLJ.
We are so pleased to see the culmination of many months of
preparation today. It is the IPLJ’s 20th Anniversary Edition, and
we wanted to commemorate this occasion with a fantastic
Symposium. As you will see, we have assembled a truly all-star
group of legal scholars and practitioners today.
Before we get started, though, we would like to acknowledge
and thank some of the people who have been instrumental in
making this event possible. First and foremost, I would like to

A PDF version of this Transcript is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexx/book3. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
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thank Emily Nash, who is our Symposium Editor and whom many
of you have already met.
Since May, Emily has been working tirelessly on making our
Volume 20 Symposium outstanding, and I think she has really
outdone herself. Her initiative has brought an excellent group of
panelists and moderators together.
When you see her today, please take a moment to thank Emily
for bringing this symposium to life. We’d also like to thank
Emily’s team of IPLJ staffers, who assisted us in getting ready for
the Symposium during the past few weeks.
Now, Emily and the IPLJ have also been very fortunate to have
the assistance of David Quiles and Helen Herman from the Office
of Public Programming and Continuing Legal Education. They
were absolutely wonderful in helping us plan and execute this
symposium.
We’d especially like to thank David for helping us facilitate
this event. David, wherever you are, you kept us on track every
step of the way and you really helped this process run smoothly.
We’d also like to thank our faculty co-moderators, Professors
Jeanne Fromer and Sonia Katyal. Their recommendations, advice,
and wonderful ideas have truly helped shape this Symposium, and
their guidance has been indispensable.
Of course, we would be remiss in our acknowledgements if we
did not recognize Professor Hugh Hansen, one of Fordham’s
distinguished Intellectual Property professors. As always, he has
given us his thoughtful insight and advice for which we are so
grateful.
Special thanks also to Professor Wendy Gordon, whose ideas
were invaluable in conceiving this Symposium, and Professor
Susan Scafidi, who advised us throughout this summer and fall.
In addition, we would like to thank our excellent panelists and
moderators for joining us at Fordham today; as I mentioned earlier,
our line-up is unparalleled. We are looking forward to a full day of
diverse, insightful, and informative discussions and debate.
Last, but not least, we could not be here today without the
IPLJ’s editors and staff. We would like to recognize them for all
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of their hard work this year. They are the backbone of our Journal,
and we are endlessly appreciative for everything they do.
The IPLJ is a very special place, a haven for IP enthusiasts here
at Fordham. Our subject matter runs the gamut from breach of
contract issues in college coaching contracts to a consideration of
race, personality, and ownership in the digital commons of music.
The four books we put out each year reflect our fascinating and
wide-ranging subject matter. We’re excited to announce that an
electronic version of our upcoming book, our first book of Volume
20, will be available shortly on the web at www.IPLJ.net. In
addition, we have copies of last year’s issues for your perusal.
Please feel free to help yourself; they’re outside.
Of course, we encourage you to consider subscribing to, or
sponsoring, the IPLJ. We also encourage authors to submit to our
Journal. Throughout the day, feel free to reach out to our Journal
members, or visit the Journal office downstairs.
As you’ll see, we have amassed a truly unique group of law
students. This group includes scientists, musicians, and artists.
Their diverse interests and backgrounds help make the Journal
office such an enjoyable and dynamic place to be. In short, we are
extremely proud of our Journal and its members.
Now to today’s events: To give you a brief preview for today,
we start out with opening remarks from Fordham’s own Dean
Treanor. Next, our first panel will examine the Federal Circuit’s In
re Bilski decision, and the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in
Bilski v. Doll, and how it will change the patent landscape with
regard to patent eligible subject matter.
Our second panel today will consider how functionality
informs design law, trade dress, and product configuration. After
our second panel, we’ll break for lunch. Finally, our third panel
will consider how trade secrets and other areas of IP can protect
advanced technology.
In sum, it is an exciting line-up. We encourage everyone to
attend all three panels today. Please note that today’s panels will
be published in Volume 20 this year, and that will be out in the
spring of 2010.
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So without further ado, it is now my pleasure to introduce Dean
Treanor, who will be delivering opening remarks. As many of you
know, William Michael Treanor is the Dean of Fordham
University School of Law.
Dean Treanor has been at Fordham since 1991. He is a
constitutional law scholar who specializes in constitutional history.
Since he’s been at Fordham, he has taught a wide range of courses
including constitutional decision-making, criminal law, land use,
property law, and, of course, intellectual property.
We are so pleased and honored that Dean Treanor will kick off
this year’s Symposium. So please give a hand in welcoming Dean
Treanor. Thank you very much.
DEAN TREANOR:
Well, thank you very much, Regina, that was really a
wonderful introduction and I think it really captures the enthusiasm
that we at Fordham Law School have about intellectual property.
This has been an amazing week for us at Fordham Law School
in the intellectual property world. The last time I was in this room,
which was two days ago, Chief Judge Michel of the Federal
Circuit, gave a public lecture and that was the culmination of his
time at Fordham as a guest of our Intellectual Property Institute.
We’re very focused on intellectual property here at Fordham.
It really goes back to Professor Hugh Hansen, who really was a
visionary in putting intellectual property at Fordham on the map,
and it continued with Professor Joel Reidenberg and Professor
Mark Patterson. We also have two extraordinary moderators of
this Journal, Professor Sonia Katyal and Professor Jeanne Fromer.
This year, we started an IP Clinic, the Samuelson-Glushko
Clinic, and Ron Lazebnik is here. We’ve had some fabulous
visiting professors; we have Wendy Gordon and Susan Scafidi,
who did so much to put this together. Then we have events like
this, which are just a showcase.
I was saying to Regina, as we walked in, that this was really
like a rock-and-roll heaven of the IP world; it’s an extraordinary
program.
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So I want to thank all of the people who did so much to put it
together again, our moderators, Jeanne and Sonia, and the
fabulous, fabulous IP Journal staff. As we were walking in,
Professor Orit Fischman Afori said, “You know, I publish in many
IP Journals, but this is the best,” and it’s just true.
So I’d like to recognize Regina, who’s doing such a fabulous
job as Editor-in-Chief; Emily Nash, who put together this amazing,
amazing Symposium, great, great job. You’re terrific. Managing
Editor, Michele Gipp, what a fabulous staff you have.
Just again, Helen Herman, David Quiles, Alice Wong, thanks
for making this happen—this doesn’t all happen by accident.
Flawlessness has a cost, and you’re the ones who make it all
happen.
So I am so excited. It’s going to be a great day. It’s a great
symposium. It’s put on by, well, I think we all have to
acknowledge the greatest IP journal in the world. So without any
further ado, let me turn you over to the first panel.
MS. NASH:
Thank you so much, Dean Treanor. I’m glad he was very
modest on behalf of the Journal. I know we got started a few
minutes late, so I’ll keep this brief.
I’d just like to begin by introducing Jeanne Fromer. Before
coming to Fordham Law School, Professor Fromer served as law
clerk to Justice David Souter of the United States Supreme Court
and to Robert Sack of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
She worked at Hale and Dorr LLP, now WilmerHale, as an
intellectual property attorney. She earned her B.A., summa cum
laude, in Computer Science from Barnard, received her S.M. in
electrical engineering and computer science from M.I.T., and her
J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 2002.
I think we can all agree, following what Dean Treanor said,
that perhaps her most impressive credential thus far is that she is
now the Faculty Moderator of Volume 20 of the IPLJ, so without
further ado, Professor Fromer.
PROF. FROMER:
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Thank you. I agree.
What I’m going to do right now, before I introduce our
wonderful panelists, is to provide a little background on the Bilski1
case and then allow our panelists to jump in after I introduce them.
First, a word on how Bilski relates to the theme of the
symposium today about functionality. Patent law is generally
about protecting functional things, but not all functional things end
up being patentable.2
One of the key questions in the Bilski case, which I’ll go into a
little bit more, is which functional things are patentable. How do
you sort between those that are and aren’t?
In the Bilski case, we’ve got two inventors who applied for a
patent for the following invention: “A method for managing the
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity
provider at a fixed price. . . .”3 It basically is a method for hedging
risk in commodities.
The invention wasn’t tied to software in any way. It was the
method with the following steps: initiating a series of transactions,
identifying market participants, and making the transactions
happen between them.4
When the inventors applied for a patent, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) refused to grant it.5 The
inventors appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and the Board
of Patent Appeals affirmed, and then they took their case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.6

1
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing the use of the
machine-or-transformation test to determine patent eligibility of process claims), cert.
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
2
See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972) (holding that a method
for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers is not patentable
subject matter).
3
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
4
See id.
5
Id. at 950.
6
See id.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s rejection.7 The court
made its ruling against its understanding, based on a number of
Supreme Court decisions, that a patent can’t preempt fundamental
principles, such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.8
The Federal Circuit’s analysis used the Supreme Court’s
decisions on patentable subject matter to divine the test for
patentable processes.9 Processes are one of the categories that §
101 in the patent law states is patentable subject matter.10
What the Federal Circuit saw in the Supreme Court’s decisions
was that something can be a patentable process if it satisfies either
of two tests: it either must be tied to a machine (and that indicates
that it’s not a natural phenomenon, not an abstract idea), or it must
transform an article to a specified different state.11
This transformation, according to the Federal Circuit, must be
central to the purpose of the claimed process.12 It can’t constitute
mere insignificant activity, either before or after the solution.13
This transformation has to impose meaningful limits on claim
scope, according to the Federal Circuit.14 It can’t preempt all uses
of the process, in which case it would be akin to an abstract idea.15
The court talked about three types of transformations: of
physical objects,16 of signals or data that represent physical

7

See id. at 966.
See id. at 952 (“[T]he Court has held that a claim is not a patent-eligible ‘process’ if
it claims ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.’” (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))).
9
See id.
10
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
11
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
12
See id. at 962.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 961.
15
See id. at 957 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)).
16
See id. at 962 (“It is virtually self-evident that a process for a chemical or physical
transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible subject matter.”
(emphasis in original)).
8
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objects,17 and of abstract concepts.18 The court ordered these from
most to least transformative.19
In applying this test of machine-or-transformation to the
method at issue here, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
invention at issue was not patentable.20 The court reasoned that the
invention was not limited to any specific machine in the associated
patent claims.21 And, the Federal Circuit continued, the invention
was about transforming legal obligations or relationships, business
risks, or other abstractions, which did not come close to the
transformation that the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
envisioned as constituting patentable subject matter.22
The implications of the Federal Circuit’s decision could be
enormous. First of all, as per this rule, it is going to be harder to
patent business methods.
The implications for software are big. Is software tied to a
general-purpose computer, a machine in the classical sense, given
that the software is a set of instructions that runs on a generalpurpose computer?
Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit talked in her Bilski
dissent about how the industry has relied on the availability of
software patents for quite a long time.23 Is it wrong to upset this
expectation?
As our panelists will suggest today, the implications of Bilski
may reach even beyond these areas. The Supreme Court recently

17

See id. at 962–63 (noting that the transformation of raw x-ray data representing
physical and tangible objects renders a claim patent eligible, but that a process of
graphically displaying variances of data from average values does not (citing In re Abele,
684 F.2d 902, 908–09 (Fed. Cir. 1982))).
18
See id. at 963 (“We note that, at least in most cases, gathering data would not
constitute a transformation of any article.” (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839–41
(Fed. Cir. 1989))).
19
See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
20
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962–66.
21
Id. at 962.
22
Id. at 963.
23
Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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heard arguments in the Bilski case on November 9th, and the Court
has not issued a decision yet.24
From a sense of oral argument, though, it looks like the patent
applicants will lose, possibly nine to nothing. The Supreme
Court’s oral argument was mostly about deciding the grounds on
which the inventors should lose.
The Supreme Court Justices were all over the map during
questioning.25 Some Justices suggested that the Court ought to
look to the original understanding of the Intellectual Property
Clause in the Constitution.26 “What are useful arts?,” the Supreme
Court justices asked.27 Some Justices suggested that maybe only
technological arts ought to be patentable, and not nontechnological inventions.28 Some Justices wondered what the
word “Process” in § 101 of the patent statute means.29 They were
interested in statutory interpretation.30 Others were thinking about
the policy implications of allowing business methods or software
to be patentable.31 Others were merely referring to the Supreme
Court precedent on abstract ideas, thinking how that would apply
in this case.32 One Justice wondered what Judge Giles Rich, one of
the principal influences on the 1952 Patent Act,33 thought about
this issue.34 The lawyer’s answer was that Judge Rich wrote the
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.35

24

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735, argued sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos (U.S. Nov. 9, 2009) (No. 08-964).
25
See id.
26
See id. at 4, 6–7. The Intellectual Property Clause empowers Congress “to Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respected Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 4.
28
See id. at 12–13.
29
See id. at 20–21.
30
See id.
31
See id. at 6–7, 46.
32
See id. at 17–18.
33
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006).
34
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 17.
35
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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opinion, which had a very broad view of patentable subject
matter.36
Almost all of the Justices were concerned with wacky
inventions.37 For example, Justice Sotomayor asked whether a
method of speed dating would be patentable.38 Justice Breyer, a
former law professor, wondered if he could patent a process for
teaching antitrust law to students where 80% of them stay awake.39
Some of the Justices were concerned about allowing software
to be patented.40 One had a question about whether software as
implemented in a machine—an actual product, not a process—
ought to be patentable.41
The question that remains open, I think, after the oral argument
is how the Justices are going to decide the case. Will they discuss
the patentability of software? Will they discuss business methods
broadly? Will they confine their ruling narrowly to Bilski’s patent
application, which is not about software?
With that background in mind, I would like to introduce our
panelists who will speak in turn on Bilski. Afterward, we will take
questions.
First up is going to be Jim Dabney. Jim is a partner at Fried
Frank. Before that, he was a partner at Pennie & Edmonds.
Jim has been recognized as a leading lawyer by Chambers
USA: America’s Leading Lawyers for Business, not only in one
area of intellectual property, but in the areas of patent, trademark,
and copyright. Jim argued two patent cases before the Supreme
Court, and he won both of them.
The two cases he argued were Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,42 which considered whether
appellate jurisdiction lay in the Federal Circuit when there was a

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 17.
See id. at 7, 9–10.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9–10.
See id. at 42–46.
Id. at 42.
535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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patent claim as a counterclaim in a lawsuit,43 and KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,44 a case which has changed the
landscape of nonobviousness in patent law. Jim is going to be
speaking about false positives and negatives in patentable subject
matter.
Next up is going to be Clarisa Long. Clarisa is the Max
Mendel Shaye Professor of Intellectual Property Law at Columbia
Law School. She has expertise in all areas of intellectual property,
though her IP experience seems to have begun in patent law.
She has written a lot of significant works in the academic
literature, including how patents serve as signals for venture
funding.45 She has also written about the information costs of
patent and copyright law46 and the PTO’s attempts to influence the
shape of patent law.47
She clerked for Judge Alvin Schall on the Federal Circuit. She
will be speaking about the culture of the Federal Circuit as a court
and how that has contributed to the way patentable subject matter
is defined generally, and how it decided Bilski.
Finally, we have Brian Murphy. Brian is a partner at Morgan
Lewis in the Intellectual Property practice. He serves as a Deputy
Practice Group Leader for the Patent Litigation Group. In patent
matters, he has represented many pharmaceutical companies,
including GlaxoSmithKline, SPI Pharma, and DuPont Air Products
Nanomaterials.
In the past several years, he has been recognized as a New
York Super Lawyer in the area of intellectual property litigation.
Brian will be speaking about Bilski’s machine-or-transformation
test, in the sense of judicial policy making, and the uncertain
prognosis for diagnostic and personalized medicine patents.
Without further ado, here is Jim.

43

Id. at 827.
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
45
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
46
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465 (2004).
47
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1965 (2009).
44
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MR. DABNEY:
Well, thank you for that introduction. How many people in the
audience are students, as opposed to practitioners or law
professors?
Well, it is a real privilege to address you today. I think you
cannot really appreciate what Professor Fromer was saying without
understanding that you all are living in an environment that did not
exist twenty-five years ago.
That environment is, since 1982 there has been in the United
States an intermediate appellate court, known as the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,48 and almost all—the
Holmes v. Vornado case has left a crack in the firmament of
appellate jurisdiction for regional circuits to hear patent cases—
intermediate appeals in patent cases, since 1982, have gone to a
single, intermediate appellate court. One consequence of that was
that there began in 1982 a series of rather significant changes in the
way patent law in the United States came to be applied.
People who graduated law school after 1982—and I was not in
that category, but I came to the field of patent law after 1982—
would tend to educate themselves on the law of patents in a way
that was very efficient, which is: let us look and see what this one
court of appeals, that has all of this power, has said on the subject
because that is probably going to have the most practical use, and
we do not need to concern ourselves with sources of law that that
court does not apply.
One consequence of that was the development of a body of law
that, in the last seven or eight years, has come under increasing
scrutiny and, some would say, deconstruction by the Supreme
Court.
One of the most controversial of the case law developments
that happened after 1982, in the Federal Circuit, was the
development that happened in the case that is on page 46 of your
course materials. This was a case known as State Street Bank &

48

28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006) (creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982).
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Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.49 I happen to know a
little bit about this case, in part because the patent that was at issue
in this case was actually prosecuted by my former law firm, Pennie
& Edmonds.50
The State Street Bank case basically raised the question, which
I think of as the “what kind” question: What kind of intellectual
conceptions fall within the regulatory scope of patent law?
For most of our nation’s history, we thought we knew what
kind of subject matter was and was not protected by patent law.
The 1952 Act says there are four categories of things that are
protected by patents.51 Those four categories are: machines,52 I
think we all know what a machine is; manufactures,53 I think we
know what that is; compositions of matter,54 all the pharmaceutical
companies know what that is; and then the fourth category is
process.55
There has been a great deal of discussion and debate over what
is encompassed by the statutory term process, which is very
broadly defined in the 1952 Act.56 Strictly speaking, the question
before the Supreme Court in the United States has to do with
whether or not the term “process” encompasses the type of novel
sequence of legal relationships, entered in a certain sequence, that
are claimed in the Bilski case.
But all of those four categories are subject to an overarching
limitation which is that Congress is only authorized to grant
patents for subject matter that is intended to, or does, promote the
progress of useful arts, using the 18th century term, useful arts.57

49

149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991) (issued Mar. 9, 1993).
51
35 U.S.C. § 101.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. § 100.
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
50
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I was quite surprised when the Supreme Court took the Bilski
case, as were many practitioners, because the actual claim in
Bilski, and the subject matter in Bilski is, in many respects, trivial
and of no commercial importance.
Bilski was a case in which, as you have heard, there was no
machinery involved. This was a trading strategy that people had
devised.58 It is the rare commercial activity today that is carried on
strictly in a person’s head, or with a pencil and paper and does not
involve a computer system or anything like that.
So the Supreme Court could render a decision in Bilski that
does not have anything to do with software, that does not have
anything to do with even the State Street Bank case. It was clear to
me, from the oral argument, that the Justices, at least prior to the
oral argument, had not fully comprehended that. In the oral
argument, the attorney for the Solicitor General told the Justices
that the State Street Bank case would have come out exactly the
same way under the machine-or-transformation test that the
Federal Circuit had articulated in the Bilski case itself.59
That puzzled at least Chief Justice Roberts, and I am sure it
would puzzle many people who are not active practitioners in
patent law, and I will try to explain to you more about that.
If you look in your book on page 46, you will find one of the
more controversial statements that was ever uttered in United
States patent case law decision-making. There is a statement
towards the bottom of your materials that says, “Since the 1952
Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been,
subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied
to any other process or method.”60
That statement, which is not supported by any citation of
authority, it is just an ipse dixit, was quite surprising to a lot of
people at the time. But that statement, in the context of this case,
58

See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
59
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 41–42.
60
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
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did not raise the hard question, because in the State Street Bank
case, what was claimed was a machine.61
You cannot get this from the State Street Bank case itself, but
State Street Bank was a case in which the commercial value of the
claimed invention had nothing to do with computer software or
computer systems. This was an innovation that allowed for
economies of scale to be realized by sponsors of mutual funds
whose expense ratios would otherwise be too high.
So some rather clever people figured out that if you would
form a partnership that would be treated as a partnership for tax
purposes, you could have a whole series of feeder funds run in a
fund-of-funds structure. This would allow for the sponsorship,
marketing, and sale of mutual funds under circumstances that
would otherwise be uneconomic to carry on.
Well, what do you need in order to carry on a business like
that? Well, what you need is a computer system that will keep
your accounts straight. That will keep track of who owns what,
what the daily asset value is in the various feeder funds, how the
expenses should be allocated, and how gains, losses, redemptions,
and contributions should be allocated.
It was nothing more than a garden variety accounting system,
implemented by means of a computer. But unlike most garden
variety accounting computer systems, this one was limited to its
deployment in the context of a series of legal relationships, in
which certain tax and economic advantages were realizable.
So the question in State Street Bank, the holding of State Street
Bank, was that the machine that was claimed in that case was a
machine.62 Well, the patent law has always applied to machines,
so of course a machine can be patentable.
The hard question that was not asked, and was not answered, in
State Street Bank, and unfortunately is not raised and cannot
properly be answered in the Bilski case is: did that machine in State
Street Bank differ from preexisting accounting systems in a
patentably-significant way? That is the hard question that is not
61
62

See id.
See id.
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raised by Bilski, which had the Justices seemingly confused by the
Government’s position that State Street Bank would come out the
same way under the machine-or-transformation test as State Street
Bank did under the law that was applied by the Federal Circuit in
that case.
So we come back to the question that is raised in the Bilski
case, which is the “what kind” question. Based on this dictum that
is on page 46 of your case book, and I emphasize it is pure,
unadulterated dictum, there was an explosion of attempts to seek
patent protection for subject matter that is seemingly described by
the statement.
One of my favorites is the patent that was issued in 2003 for a
method of jury selection.63 The patent recites the following series
of steps: you get two lawyers in a room; you get a whole set of
potential jurors in the room; you go through a peremptory
challenge exercise. You all know how lawyers get to exercise
challenges for cause and challenges—subject to constitutional
restrictions, you cannot do it based on race and all that stuff—but
you get to exercise a certain amount of choice over who you want
on your jury. Trial lawyers can sometimes make a lot of money by
convincing clients that they are really good jury pickers. So this is
a method where you get the potential jury pool and you strike off
the jurors who you think are going to be adverse to you.
So you create a pool of the struck jurors. Now you have two
groups of people, the ones that you think are good for you and the
others that you think are not so good for you and then you make
your presentation to both sets of jurors. You see whether the ones
you think are good for you actually vote for you better than the
ones that you struck off. If it turns out that the jurors you struck
off are no better for you than the ones that you kept on, that means
you are not a very good jury picker, and you need to refine your
technique.
So this patent describes a method for improving jury selection
techniques. That was a method that was characterized by the
Patent Office as a patentable invention and a patent issued to a

63

U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001) (issued Aug. 19, 2003).
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person from New York named Genevie in 2003.64 I have a copy of
it if anybody wants to see it, I can give you the patent number.
That is the kind of allegedly patentable invention involved in
the Bilski case that raises the “what kind” question. What kinds of
intellectual conceptions do we think should fall within the subject
matter regulation of patent law as distinct from something else?
As the State Street Bank case illustrates, the statutory
classifications “machine” and “process” are quite unsatisfactory as
dividers between what ought and ought not be patentable. The
reason for that is shown by the State Street Bank case itself. There
is almost nothing that you could think of today that could not be
characterized as a machine, almost nothing.
I think most people would agree that music, an original song
that someone might write, is probably not an invention, even
though it might be novel, non-obvious, and useful. But, you could
characterize a song as a process for entertaining an audience. You
could describe a machine that outputs certain sounds, which just so
happen to correspond with the notes of a song, just as a computer
system can be configured to keep accounts the way you can with a
pencil and paper.
There is a certain amount of artificiality to discussions about
whether or not something is or is not properly classified as a
process or as a machine. That leaves unasked and unanswered the
hard question, which the Federal Circuit did not have to address
because it was an intermediate court, but the Supreme Court in
Bilski may very well address, which is—what is embraced by the
constitutional term useful arts?
This is why many people in the patent community are very
worried about Bilski. It is rather ironic that those who are
financially supporting the Bilski petitioners in the Supreme Court
did so because they felt that the court of appeals in Bilski had gone
too far in limiting what all can be claimed to be an invention in the
business method patent arena.
It apparently never occurred to those who are supporting this
that the Supreme Court of the United States would far more likely
64

Id.
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view the Federal Circuit as having gone not nearly far enough in
limiting what cannot be patented as an invention. As is illustrated
in one of the briefs that Professor Fromer has included in the
materials, the standard that was applied by the Federal Circuit in
the Bilski case is one that would leave State Street Bank decided
exactly the same way. That was a machine; therefore it is
patentable, right?
So what I would say, I think I am probably—I haven’t seen
how much time I have, five minutes, I have five minutes left.
The thing I would emphasize to you is that, when you consider
what types of innovations are and are not properly subject to
regulation by patents, you really need to look beyond the form to
the substance. So it ought not be particularly significant that a
machine is recited in a claim.
What ought to be significant is the contribution made by the
person who applied for the patent—what gives value to what the
person disclosed in an application or what the person conceived.
Then you can have a meaningful conversation about whether or
not the contribution that was made is one that is fairly
characterized as falling within the useful arts, properly understood
and properly characterized as falling within any of the statutory
classifications, and that will avoid a lot of the artifice that has
unfortunately dominated a great deal of the debate over this
question.
The Bilski case, unlike the State Street Bank case, has exposed
in all of its nakedness the “what kind” question. In the State Street
Bank case, since the claims cited a machine, it was ambiguous why
those claims were allowed. This has great practical importance in
litigation, let me tell you.
If you have, for instance, a patent that recites a computer
system that is configured to provide certain asserted valuable,
observable behaviors, well, one of the things that you have to do in
patent litigation nowadays is to interpret what the claim words
mean. This is a process known as “claim construction.”65 Patent
65

Patenthawk.com, Staking a Claim—Legal Backdrop, http://patenthawk.com/
claims.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
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claim words are supposed to be interpreted from the point of view
of a person having skill in the art of a patent.66 Well, a patent
claiming a computer system is configured to maintain books of
account, or to implement an online trading system, or to carry on
business activity of some kind, confounds analysis. Who is the
person skilled in the art? Is it the person who uses the system, the
bond trader, the commodities trader, the online vendor? Is it the
programmer who programs the computer system to bring about
these behaviors, or is it the computer system?
I had a case in which a patent recited providing a workup
system state. The word “state” means something quite different to
a person in the field of computer science than it might to someone
who doesn’t know anything about computer programming. State is
a term of art in one field; it is not in another. Those kinds of
complexities arise when you do not focus on the applicant’s
contribution, but instead get too caught up in the form in which
claimed inventions are patented.
I am going to subside at this point and turn it over to my copanelists. But I’ll be happy to answer any questions you may have
after the others are done. Thank you.
PROF. LONG:
[Please note that Professor Long’s remarks are not published in
this transcript.]
MR. MURPHY:
I am just going to rely on a few PowerPoints to try and help my
presentation along. So I do not know if anyone can call those up
for me.
But good—while we wait for that, good morning everyone.
Yes, that would not be me. I am Brian Murphy. I am going to be
speaking from a different perspective. It is a counterpoint, I think,
in many ways to the issues Jim has raised and it really picks up, I
think, probably on the last point that Clarisa was just making about
a very interesting analogy to the color white, and how do you
know it if you have never seen it before.

66

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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You must understand that underlying this intellectual debate
about what is patent eligible and what might not be patent eligible
is a very commercially significant dispute between two industries.
There is the financial services industry, which is tired of business
method patents, tired of being sued, they feel, frivolously, in the
Eastern District of Texas, where judgments are being entered
against them. Then there are the pharmaceutical and biotech
industries. These industries are very fearful that the Supreme
Court and even the Federal Circuit have gone too far in using
machine-or-transformation as a proxy for the initial threshold of
what is patent eligible, which is to be distinguished from, and it is
an important distinction, the requirements of patentability.
In my view, the Bilski test, particularly for processes—pure
processes—goes too far only because it is a mandatory test. It is a
mandatory proxy. I think it is a useful test. It is particularly useful
in the business method context, it is very useful to limit business
method patents and that’s what was done.
Perhaps the unintentional consequence is, what do you do in
other areas, other scientific industries, like diagnostic methods or
genetic screening methods, where focusing on the notion of
transformation really does not get you to the heart of the question?
Because it is not necessarily the transformation that is the inventive
concept, the inventive concept is recognizing a correlation between
data and a condition. What is more important than diagnosis?
You cannot treat the patient optimally until you have the right
diagnosis and that is what a lot of these method claims are all
about.
So my thesis is that the transformational analysis focuses on
the wrong question. I hope the Supreme Court considers going
back to the so-called Fundamental Principles Exception, where the
better question is does the invention as a whole preempt a naturally
occurring phenomenon, a natural law, or fundamental principle.67

67

See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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No one disagrees that a naturally occurring phenomenon is not
patentable and that it is a broad test.68 The point is—it is a low
bar.
The reason it is a low bar is because courts have always
understood that what inventors really are entitled to is a rigorous
examination under the conditions for patentability. The conditions
for patentability are in section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act.69 These
conditions are the second part of the test, while the natural
phenomenon preemption is the first part of the test. The first part
of the test is a very low bar while the second part is a much higher
bar.
Just because a process might qualify as patent eligible,
absolutely does not mean you’re going to get a patent, and that is, I
think, part of the visceral reaction, particularly that you get by the
Supreme Court Justices, like you saw in Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (“LabCorp”).70
LabCorp will be discussed briefly, but the question one has to ask
is how that could possibly be patentable, it is too broad.71
Maybe the problem in LabCorp is that the claim is not
particularly claimed or it is overbroad. But is it really not patent
eligible?72 Maybe, maybe. Then the really important question is
what test do you apply? Should the court apply the machine-ortransformation test, and particularly the transformation test for
process patents regardless of the technology area?73

68

See id. (“This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to [35 U.S.C.] § 101 and
every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent
protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”).
69
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title [35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376].”).
70
548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
71
See id. at 125–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the patent claim invalid as a
natural phenomenon).
72
See id.
73
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964,
2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
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We are having some technical difficulties, so I’ll try to draw
some images for you.
Whenever I’m faced with a difficult intellectual question—and
this is certainly a difficult question—I always ask myself what
would Mr. Jefferson say?
Those of you who have read Bilski are familiar with Judge
Rader’s dissenting opinion where he quoted Thomas Jefferson’s
belief that “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”74
That is, I think, an eloquent statement of the underlying policy and
rationale for a broad first step, or low threshold, for patent
eligibility.
But even Mr. Jefferson was a little conflicted and recognized
the difficulty of drawing lines in the area of patentable subject
matter. Years later he also said, “[C]onsidering the exclusive right
to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of
society, I know well the difficulty of drawing the line between
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an
exclusive patent, and those which are not.”75
Now I’m a fan of Mr. Jefferson, but I do think we have evolved
quite a bit since the notion of an exclusive patent as an
embarrassment. But I think it points out that even from the
drafting of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution
which promotes the progress of science and useful arts,76 there has
been some conflict. Where do you draw the line?
But the line is drawn as a matter of policy, not judicial decision
making. When you upset well-settled doctrine in the judicial role,
you run the risk of stepping over the line. We all know courts
consider policy—it is part of human nature and you have to. But it
is the role of the legislature to make those policy judgments—not
the courts.
Real quickly through the statute, this is what I was referring to
as the test on eligibility: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
74

Id. at 1011 (Radar, J., dissenting) (quoting WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76
(Washington ed. 1871)).
75
Writings from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
76
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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and useful process”77—we are focusing on process here because
that is really what the fight is about—“or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof.”78 That is
patent eligibility—very broad and to be liberally encouraged.
Patents are still subject to the conditions and requirements of
the title we all are familiar with—novelty, utility, sufficient
description, enablement, claim particularity, and definiteness.79
These are not insignificant requirements.
This is well settled law in multiple Supreme Court decisions,
including Diamond v. Diehr,80 cited for different propositions,
depending on whether you read the majority or dissenting
decisions in Bilski, but the quote is, “We have more than once
cautioned that courts should not read into the patent laws
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed.”81 This is really, I think, what is underlying this debate.
What has been clear, what is well-settled law, in terms of
patent eligibility and particularly of processes, is that a process is
not patent eligible if it claims a natural law itself.82 One cannot
claim a natural phenomenon, as LabCorp articulates—electricity,
metabolic functions that occur naturally in the human body, and
the atomic structure are natural phenomena—one cannot claim
And, of course, abstract ideas,
these things effectively.83
particularly mathematical algorithms, which apply with particular
force in the business method context, are not patentable.84
77

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Id.
79
See id. §§ 101, 112.
80
450 U.S. 175 (1981). Note that the proposition of Diehr is different in Bilski’s
majority and dissent. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Radar, J.,
dissenting) (“In reading Diehr to suggest a non-statutory transformation or preemption
test, this court ignores the Court’s admonition that all recent holdings do no more than
restate the natural laws . . . exclusions.”), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct.
2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9,
2009).
81
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (internal quotations omitted).
82
“Einstein could not have ‘patent[ed] his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could
Newton have patented the law of gravity.’” Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83
See id.
84
See, e.g., id.
78
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Now I will focus on the life sciences patents to add a little
context. Generally it has been clear that novel pharmacologic
agents constitute patentable subject matter. There are thousands, if
not tens of thousands, of patents on novel pharmacologic agents—
small molecule drugs or prescription drugs that we consume every
day. Isolated DNA and RNA sequences are well established as
patentable and are useful in biotechnology companies as probes for
assessing binding affinity or for testing potentially new and helpful
biological molecules as therapeutics.85 Recombinant proteins and
therapeutic proteins, such as Genentech’s Rituxan and Herceptin,
are incredibly powerful drugs that are patentable.86 There is no
question they are patent eligible as they both are in fact patented.
Moving down the line, methods of treatment typically claimed
in the pharmaceutical arena as administration of therapeutically
effective amounts of a drug are classically patentable.87 There is
no need to go into what the transformation is.
A more interesting example is surgical procedures. In the early
1990s, a successful eye surgeon claimed and had patented a pure
method of making a particular type of incision in cataract eye
surgery.88 It was clearly purely process and needed only a scalpel
and a physician to use it, but the claim was the process for using
that particular type of incision. It was a particular practical
application of a process, it did not preempt all types of cataract
surgery, and it did not preempt all types of eye surgery.
There was never any question that the process was patent
eligible. There was an absolute outcry and uproar by the American
Medical Association, on a policy basis, that you should not be able

85

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,313,282 (filed July 18, 1997) (issued Nov. 6, 2001)
(claiming an isolated DNA sequence which can serve as a terminator region in a chimeric
gene capable of being used for the transformation of plants).
86
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,297,760 (filed Dec. 15, 2003) (issued Nov. 20, 2007);
U.S. Patent No. 5,736,137 (filed Nov. 3, 1993) (issued Apr. 7, 1998).
87
See, e.g., Nicardipine Pharm. Composition for Parenteral Admin., U.S. Patent No.
5,164,405 (filed Oct. 22, 1990) (issued Nov. 17, 1992).
88
Method of Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision, U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (filed
June 28, 1990) (issued Jan. 14, 1992).
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to enforce such a patent.89 The issue was not patent eligibility, it
was patent enforceability, and Congress spoke. It spoke by
enacting § 287(c), which now precludes the enforcement of these
particular types of medical procedures during surgery.90
I submit that is the more appropriate precedent for what I think
we are dealing with now, in Bilski. I think you have, in the Federal
Circuit’s majority decision, a very sophisticated use of a proxy test
that, in fact, intentionally narrows patent eligibility, when it should
not, but perhaps unintentionally does not appreciate the impact on
new technologies, particularly in the pharmaceutical and biotech
arena.
Briefly, these types of diagnostic method claims, in LabCorp.
which we will go to immediately, have been called “determineand-infer.” So determine and infer is a two-step process, a credit
to Professor Collins, who has kind of characterized it this way.91
The first step is an assay step.92 It is very physical, very
specific: you take a blood test, you run the test, whatever you are
looking for, you get a result.
From the result, you infer or make a diagnosis that happens in
the mind of the trained physician. That is the process.
If you analyzed it, under well settled law of the Fundamental
Principles Exception, the question that should be asked is whether
the claim as a whole recites a natural law, a natural phenomenon,
extract, idea; or perhaps more usefully, does the claim as a whole
define an application of the principle or the phenomenon that has
been discovered, that no one discovered before, but happens to be
naturally occurring.
Is that being applied with sufficient
89
See Sabra Chartrand, Why Is This Surgeon Suing?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at D1
(“Leaders of the medical community are scrambling to stamp out a trend they think
threatens innovation—and a doctor’s freedom to offer patients the best care.”).
90
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006); see also Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Cataract &
Refractive Surgery, President Signs Medical Patent Bill; Physicians Freed from Threat of
New Medical Procedure Patent Lawsuits (Oct. 1, 1996), available at http://www.cptech.
org/ip/cataract.txt.
91
See Kevin E. Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of
Intangibility, PATENTLY-O, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/collins.
intangibility.pdf.
92
Id. at 1.
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particularity so that it does not preempt all uses of the principle,
like the surgical method and the incision technique that was patent
eligible and patented, but ultimately non-enforceable?93
Contrast that to a mandatory Bilski analysis. Does the assay
step transform a particular article into a different state or a thing?
Who cares? Of course it does.
That is not the heart of the invention. The heart of the
invention was the recognition of a relationship, and in LabCorp, it
was a naturally occurring relationship or phenomenon.94
The transformation really is not essential. So by design, you
perhaps have condemned these types of claims to patent
ineligibility without ever having given the Patent Office or the
patentee the opportunity to try and get them examined rigorously
under the statutory requirements for patentability.
Under Bilski, if there is a transformation, the question is if it is
central to the purpose of the claim process and not merely what is
called “insignificant extra-solution activity.”95 That is a danger for
those in the pharmaceutical industry and the biotechnological arts.
So let us take a quick look at LabCorp. This was the so-called
determine-and-infer template, and it is a very broad claim. The
method is for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate, a
naturally occurring human condition, which is a disease.96
To detect it, you assay a body fluid, take a blood sample, and
run the test, which is clearly transformative, but all you are looking
for is this particular homocysteine level. This is nothing new.
People already knew how to measure for homocysteine. What was
new is somebody who said, “ah-ha,” if you have elevated
homocysteine, if you are not within the normal bounds for this
blood test, you have a cobalamin or folate deficiency, you are a
very sick person, and you need a particular kind of treatment.
93

See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127–28
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
96
See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94
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What is not included in the claim is any particular application
of the phenomenon. This phenomenon, the correlation between
elevated homocysteine levels and a deficiency of these two
vitamins, is naturally occurring. No one created it, you are simply
observing it, and you can’t patent it.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, which everyone has had a lot to
say about, I think, first analyzed it and under the Fundamental
Principles Exception noted that the correlation itself is a natural
phenomenon, there was really no dispute.97
That doesn’t
necessarily end the analysis of patent eligibility because you need
to look at the claim as a whole. What else does the claim say? In
this case, all it says is you assay to get a homocysteine level.
He said next, in a pre-Bilski application of the transformation
test, that the claim didn’t recite a process for transforming blood or
any other matter.98 In my view, this was clearly wrong. I think it
was legally relevant, but wrong. That was part of the problem with
applying this test in this area of technology.
He finally answered the question, if you will, as a formulation
of the so-called insignificant extra-solution activity concept, and he
got to the heart of the matter. The only thing he can find, apart
from the assay, which was nothing new and not unique, was the
correlation. “I can find nothing [in this claim] that adds anything
more of significance.”99 What he was really talking about was,
where’s the practical application?
In re Grams,100 another case, was interesting because it was
noted by Bilski in the Federal Circuit. It is interesting because it is
really a combination of what I call a determined-and-inferred
diagnostic process, but also uses Bilski-type algorithms to crunch
data. What you’re really doing is taking a whole bunch of data
from a blood test. You take a blood panel of multiple data
points—not just, for example, a homocysteine level—you crunch
and you basically program on a computer and you try and tease out
and isolate what’s causing the illness. But again, that’s, in case
97
98
99
100

Id. at 135.
See id. at 136.
Id. at 138.
888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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you can’t see it, that icon is a thinker, meaning it’s a thinking step.
So the only assay or physical step is taking the blood sample,
followed by a bunch of algorithms or mental processes, which is
very clearly found to be non-statutory subject matter, but analyzed,
and Judge Michel was one of the panel members on this decision,
the claim as a whole covers an algorithm.
They actually explored a different test, called the FreemanWalter-Abele Test,101 but the concept was there was no practical
application to a process and that physical elements and mere datagathering was just not enough to cut it.
What I found most interesting was that Bilski commented on
this case and said, “[I]n most cases, gathering data would not
constitute a transformation of any article.”102 Well, that’s true. In
the business method context, and in the software context, it’s
manifestly not true, as we’ll see in the Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services103 case that was just decided,
when you’re talking about diagnostic methods.
So let’s look at Prometheus—that is perhaps the most
interesting case—recently decided, post-Bilski.
In an interesting twist, not purely claimed as a so-called
diagnostic method, not just determine-and-infer. What was
different?
It was looking to optimize treatment.
They
administered a patient a drug which metabolizes. So you’re
looking for this thing called 6-TG, just like homocysteine, and you
want to find out what the level is in the person’s body.
Under Bilski, if you’re looking at this from the machine-ortransformation perspective, the first two steps, in my view, are
nothing more than mere data-gathering in the two-step process,
rather than a one-step process.
That is where Bilski can lead to a false result, because the
wherein clauses, which is supposed to be the practical application
101

See, e.g., In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
102
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
103
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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of understanding this relationship, that if you have too much of the
metabolite, or, excuse me, an X-level, you need to increase the
dosage. If you have a higher level, the Y-level, you have to
decrease the dosage of the drug. Those wherein clauses don’t tell
you to administer the drug or to increase the dose. They are, I
think, accurately characterized by the district court below,104 who
rejected this claim as a warning to say, okay, I have administered
the drug. I’ve measured my level of metabolite. I know it is a
warning. It tells you I should increase the dose, or I should
decrease the dose. It does not tell you that you need to do it or
how to do it, but that does not mean it is not patent eligible.
If you analyzed it under the Fundamental Principles Exception
and asked, are you preempting a naturally occurring phenomenon
with this claim? The answer is clearly no. It’s a simpler test, and
you don’t run into the, I think, intellectual gymnastics that the
Federal Circuit used to try and save this claim. It used, in my
view, the improper analogy that it’s a method of treatment. It’s
okay because it’s a method—the language was, in effect, it’s a
method of treatment.
It’s not a diagnostic trying to optimize a treatment method. If
you wanted to claim a method of treatment, you would have said,
in the end, administer the following dosage of the drug. It doesn’t
say that.
Under a Fundamental Principles Exception test, you would
simply say the drug had to be administered by a man, to generate a
metabolite level. That is a man-made, if you will, correlation, it’s
not naturally occurring. It is not someone who is sick and whose
sickness is represented by some naturally occurring metabolic
function. It is a man-made intervention to create a metabolite level
and say, hey, look that is not a naturally occurring phenomenon;
this claim is patent eligible.
Again, it doesn’t mean the claim is, per se, patentable. But if
you use the Fundamental Principles Exception test, however you
wish, I think you focus on the better question, which is: are you
104
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 05cv1200, 2008 WL
878910, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (characterizing the “wherein” clause as “only a
mental step” and not requiring any action).
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preempting all uses, an entire field of uses of a particular naturally
occurring phenomenon or are you not? Are you doing something
more? In your claim, is there either a non-naturally occurring
phenomenon, as in this case, or is there a practical application or
treatment step, whether it’s administration of a drug, using a
particular surgical technique, or using non-invasive therapy?
Whatever it might be, you either need to add that practical step or
you need to have something that’s not a naturally occurring
phenomenon, as in Prometheus.105
So my real point here is that I think Prometheus gives you an
excellent example of where the transformation test has limitations
that were unintended. It’s not particularly helpful to address the
questions of what’s really patent eligible, what’s the inventive
concept, and has the claim been drafted that way?
We do need the flexibility of that Fundamental Principles
Exception and I think the best question to be asked is the bottom
one. Does the process preempt the principle of phenomenon or
apply it in a particularized way? If you ask that question, you will
get a better result in terms of patent eligibility.
Thank you.
PROF. FROMER:
Okay. Now we’re going to have some time for Q&A.
I’d just ask that you please state your name before you ask your
question.
MR. MILLER:
Hi. I’m Joel Miller. I have a question for Mr. Dabney.
If I mischaracterize, please correct me, I understood, rather
than look at the specific category of 101, you would advocate the
contribution that the claimed invention would bring. How would a
court, and perhaps more importantly, how would the PTO address
whether a claim has this contribution? And clean it up for me, if I
didn’t state it accurately please. Thank you.
MR. DABNEY:

105

Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1336.
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Well, what I basically advocate is trying to avoid allowing a
formalism, such as machine-or-transformation, to dominate the
analysis.
Every time the Patent Office has to decide whether claimed
subject matter is non-obvious, they need to identify the differences
between what is claimed and what was previously known. Very
often, those differences will lie solely in something like a method
of doing business, a set of legal relationships, etc.
The hard question, therefore, simply becomes analyzing
whether the differences between something claimed and what preexisted count for purposes of patentability.
So if the only difference between a particular machine and last
year’s machine is the tax shelter scheme that it implements, you
can isolate on that and say, is this the kind of innovation that
qualifies for patent protection, shorn of the confounding that comes
from analyzing it as a machine or asking whether the fact that it’s
characterized as a machine, should that matter at all?
So that’s what I was trying to do, to focus on the differences
as—in a § 103 context.
MR. MILLER:
So if I understand correctly, you’re not focusing so much on
eligibility, rather novelty and obviousness?
MR. DABNEY:
No. The debate in Bilski, the debate in Prometheus, the debate
in all of these cases has to do, ultimately, at the end of the day,
with whether or not a patent should be granted, on subject matter
that’s claimed.106
We’ve heard, I think, a fairly compelling demonstration that
the discovery that a certain physical correlation between
homocysteine levels, for example, and a certain disease condition
is not very well-analyzed, in terms of whether it’s tied to a
particular machine or whether it transforms matter from one state
of thing to another.

106

Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1336; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943.
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But I think most people when they’re in the room would
instinctively see that there’s a qualitative, or an important,
difference between that type of discovery and the creation of a
dispute resolution process in which you put an arbitration clause in
the will, which was the In re Comiskey107 case, which was the only
case, by the way, where the Federal Circuit had tentatively
provided an answer to the hard question, which is, okay, suppose
it’s not Bilski where it’s just the legal relationships and you do
have a machine and the only difference is the allegedly novel set of
legal relationships that the machine implements. The Federal
Circuit’s original answer in Comiskey was so controversial that
they went back, basically, to expunge from the Federal Reporter
that portion of the opinion in which the court had basically said
that the alleged novel legal relationships do not count in a § 103
analysis.108 So that’s been left for another day, as to whether to do
that.
The one thing that no one has said, but what I think is kind of a
sleeper issue here, is that the Constitution uses the word
“Discoveries.”109
Now, what obviously happened in the LabCorp case, what
obviously happened in the Prometheus case, what obviously has
happened in all these determine-and-infer cases, a person has
discovered something. People are afraid of trying to patent things
that are characterized as discoveries because of other formalisms
that say, “well, you can’t patent a discovery, it’s got to be an
invention,” something like that.
It seems to me that there’s a big difference between those
different types of conceptions. It’s a long-winded way to respond,
but it’s the same question at the end of the day: you have to
identify how the claimed invention differs from the prior art.
But the hard question is not going to be whether or not it’s
wrapped in the machine or whether you characterize it as a
107

554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
“Acting en banc, the court today vacated the September 20, 2007, judgment in this
case, and the panel’s original opinion, which is reported at 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007), was withdrawn.” Id. at 969.
109
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
108
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transformation or not. I believe it’s, at the end of the day, going to
come down to whether or not it is the type of conception that falls
within the useful arts.
MR. GRAFF:
Focusing on what you just said, and also applying it in the
diagnostics area, let’s be practical. A doctor observes something in
a patient and he may or may not have read the patent or he may
have thought of it himself, and he recognizes a relationship
between this condition and a particular disease or symptom or
whatever, needs vitamin B-12 or whatever Metabolite.
Does it make sense in the real world to say that having thought
of this, the doctor is infringing a patent, he owes a royalty or he
can be enjoined from treating a patient for the disease because he
recognized a correlation that existed and a particular physical
condition? Does that make any sense from a commercial point of
view, from an economic point of view, is that someplace that the
patent law ought to be going, to use Mr. Dabney’s phrase, is that
the sort of thing that ought to be patented?
MR. DABNEY:
Well, I guess, the answer to a question like that very much
depends on how the story is told. If the story is told that
researchers, at some major research university spent years and
years and years doing basic research to try to understand how the
body responds to various external stimuli and after expenditure of
years of effort and investment, a Nobel Prize-winning discovery is
made, that the way to avoid contracting certain diseases is to
respond when a certain correlation is found to exist by drinking a
glass of milk or something like that. It may or may not wind up
being novel; it may or may not be something that’s patentable for
other reasons. But it’s hard to see why you would say
categorically that that’s not a discovery within the meaning of the
Constitution.
It may be that you can prove that it was inherently anticipated
and it’s not novel or something like that, but what we’re talking
about is, I believe, what all is comprehended within the meaning of
the phrase “useful arts” in the Constitution. That’s what has
people so worried about Bilski—that the Supreme Court can’t duck
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that question and at least some originalists on the Supreme Court
are quite interested in that question.
So it seems to me that there’s a lot of room for argument,
whether or not the recognition of a correlation between
phenomenon A and condition B is a discovery that can’t
appropriately be patented.
If it’s a truly natural phenomenon, you won’t be able to patent
it under any of these doctrines here. But if, for instance, you
artificially disturb that natural phenomenon by doing a certain
thing—.
MR. GRAFF:
Well, then Prometheus holds, really.
MR. DABNEY:
Yes, and it’s really not at all surprising to me.
MR. MURPHY:
I agree. I just wanted to jump in and say it’s all in how you
claim it. Jim’s last point is exactly the seminal point. If you do
something to artificially disturb, alter, apply the concept that’s
been discovered, it’s patent eligible and can be tested—but if you
claim it, as they tried in LabCorp that was just one claim, by the
way, for context.
The LabCorp claim was the broadest claim, there are lots of
other claims that there was no dispute about patent eligibility or
even patentability because there were particular methods of
carrying out the assay that the defendant Metabolite actually used
for a time, paid a royalty, then stopped using and said, I’m not
paying the royalty, it’s a big commercial fight, that’s all that was.
But that particular claim, in its breadth, I think no one—I don’t
think there’s any serious dispute, it’s not patent eligible, because of
the way it was claimed, as a whole, trying to preempt an entire
natural phenomenon, which happened to be a very powerful new
discovery. But you can’t claim it that way, and I don’t think the
law should be that broad or should trend in that direction.
MR. GRAFF:
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To follow-up, I don’t see a huge difference between your
characterization of how Prometheus should have been decided,
which I understood to be a condition that was induced by man and
a transformation test. Because as I understand the transformation
test, if properly applied, is simply changing something from the
way it existed in nature, which is the way I think the Federal
Circuit applied it in its decision.
MR. MURPHY:
Yes, I think that the problem I had with it, I think it lends itself,
transformation, as applied, particularly in cases like LabCorp,
Grams, and Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC110 and
the so-called transformation, they’re focusing on extracting a blood
sample or testing it as a transformation.
The administration of the drug allows you to generate a piece
of data. Sure, it’s a transformation, but that’s not really the
patentable discovery. What they’re focusing on is you’re taking
that data point and then you’re making a new correlation.
I just think the transformation test unduly narrows the focus of
the inquiry, that’s all, that’s all I’m saying. I think, because if you
read the decision, the court said it’s effectively a method of
treatment. That’s the problem, that’s really the problem I have
with it, because it’s not.
MR. DABNEY:
There’s nothing wrong with transformation as an idea to use in
an analysis like this. The problem with it is the same problem that
any formalism has, you can’t generalize from it very well. You
can’t abstract it, it doesn’t apply and it lends itself to arguments
that, well, my legal relationships have been transformed, my
economic condition has been transformed, my risks have been
hedged, and have been transformed—there were some silly
arguments that were made in the Bilski case.
So certainly as to many traditional technologies, the fact that
crude oil is transformed into various distillates is something that
it’s easy to see, that that is a process. But it just isn’t—it doesn’t—
to say that that is part of a unitary standard of broad general
110

Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649, 2008 WL 5273107 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008).
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applicability without pausing to consider, well, does this fall within
the useful arts or not? I’m just going to say, a machine-ortransformation? It seems to me it’s an oversimplification.
MR. HOFFBERG:
Hi. Steve Hoffberg. I have a comment and a question.
The comment, I present for three reasons. One is, we’re in an
academic environment, I want to justify the use—my fiddling with
a Smartphone during your presentation, and it also gets to the issue
of person of skill in the art and the interpretation of words. There’s
a definition of the word “Embarrassment” that is “A state of
confusion arising from hesitation or difficulty in choosing.”111
So the common definition we accept today is not the only one
and probably is not the one that Jefferson intended.
The question I have is, if a new use of an old machine is
presumably acceptable as patentable subject matter, why is not a
new function of an old machine?
MR. DABNEY:
Who says it isn’t?
MR. HOFFBERG:
Well, that’s a question that the Supreme Court is wrestling
with.
MR. DABNEY:
Well, no, it isn’t, because in the Bilski case, there is no
apparatus involved at all.
MR. HOFFBERG:
Oh, no, I’m talking about what was said from the bench, in
terms of whether an old computer with new software is really just
an old computer and not a patentable machine, or whether the
software is treated as making it into a new machine.
MR. DABNEY:
I personally will be very surprised if the Supreme Court
Justices say one word about software or articulates a holding that is
111

Allwords.com, Embarrassment, http://www.allwords.com/word-embarrassment.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
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at least intended by them to have any impact, whatsoever, on the
software industry.
I know why they’re worried about it, they have reason to be
worried about it, but the case certainly does not involve that.
There’s absolutely no conceptual problem with saying that a
computer system that is configured with software is a novel
machine, there just isn’t. The difficult questions that come with
claims to computer-implemented subject matter are where there is
no novelty, or nonobviousness, in the means of implementation,
but the value lies in the end-results, the effects produced, the
behaviors that the computer brings about. Those types of
questions, very often, shade into Bilski-type problems because the
end-results might be implementing a set of legal relationships.
You get right back to the question of what the difference is.
If the difference is a difference that has value because of
something that is a business method, then you get into the question
that I was trying to deal with, with the question over here. But I
don’t think that computer software, that the question you’re raising
is one that there’s any serious debate about today, despite what
some commentators have sort of tried to shout down from the
mountaintop, that Bilski is going to spell the death of software. I
personally don’t see that there’s any significant chance of that.
PROF. FROMER:
I think we have time for one more question.
MS. PFAFFENBACH:
I just had a question, in all these cases, whether it’s Bilski or
Prometheus or LabCorp what is discovered is an algorithm, a
relationship; we have X, you end up at the other side with Y.
The inventive part of it, which doesn’t seem to be claimed, in
the case—well, maybe in LabCorp, I’ll take Prometheus, is that if
human, something new made by man, would be to inject another
variable, to then make Y enhanced, or decreased. Wouldn’t that
be—that would be patentable. Would that—is that arguable?
MR. MURPHY:
Well, I mean, I think if I understand you correctly, I think the
answer is, yes, it would be patent eligible. It’s the human

C01_PANEL_1_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE)

752

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/19/2010 11:53 AM

[Vol. 20:715

intervention in some way that needs to be particularized in the
claim.
MS. PFAFFENBACH:
Right.
MR. MURPHY:
That allows you to do that, but in the absence of such a
particularized step, and it only takes one step, it would not be
patent eligible if it’s merely the discovery of something that’s
naturally occurring.
MR. DABNEY:
This question about embarrassment made me think of
something that could possibly be something that the Supreme
Court does in Bilski.
Those of you who have ever taken copyright law know that in
some important Supreme Court decisions, after-developed
technologies have come before the court. Well, the—does the
Constitutional term “Writings” apply to photographs, which were
not known at the time of the Constitution?112
Does the
Constitutional term “Writings” apply to player piano rolls113 or
phonograph records and other things that didn’t exist at the
time?114
So if the Supreme Court is going to get serious about
construing the Constitution in this case, it would possibly have
occasion to consider whether or not this Bilski case is in the
tradition of those. The problem that Bilski is going to have is that
in 1787, there was a lot of business going on.
What’s claimed in Bilski is not exactly like an after-developed
technology like phonograph records or photography or something
like that. So certainly the questions on the bench from all the
Justices, I think, would lead one to think that if that was the
direction they were going to go, they would say that this type of
commercial activity, hedging, was certainly known at the time of

112
113
114

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
See, e.g., id.
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the framing and we cannot, therefore, say that they were going to,
no matter what philosophy you adopt—whether it’s the originalists
or a more, whatever the other alternative philosophy is, I don’t
want to characterize it—they would lose under that as well.
PROF. FROMER:
Okay. Please join me in thanking our panelists.

